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THE TERMINATION OF REPRESENTATION
AGREEMENTS: THE APPLICATION OF




Several interesting legal questions in the area of comparative
law were left unanswered in July of 1977 due to the extrajudicial
settlement of a lawsuit initiated by a foreign sales representative
against an American manufacturer. The suit was based on dam-
ages allegedly incurred by the sales representative when the manu-
facturer terminated the parties' representation agreement. In
particular, two issues are significant to the practicing lawyer who is
called upon to resolve transnational or comparative law problems
in the United States. They are, (1) the application of foreign law in
a lawsuit commenced in the Federal Courts of the United States,
and (2) the use of the concept of abuso de derecho 1 in the termina-
tion of representation agreements. For purposes of our discussion,
the chosen forum shall be the United States District Court for the
Middle District of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the ap-
plicable foreign law shall be the law of the Republic of Argentina.
The principal objective of this article is to raise the aforecited
legal issues and to present the legal arguments in favor of the posi-
tion that (i) Argentine law should be applied to the facts of the case;
and (ii) the concept of abuso de derecho should protect the sales
representative and require the manufacturer to pay all damages
proximately caused by its termination of the representation agree-
ment, including punitive damages. We hope that our rather sum-
marized adversarial presentation of this complicated material will
engender further scholarly research and a brisk debate of the merits
of the case and our conclusions.
* A member of the Bars of the State of New York and the Federative Republic of
Brazil, presently practicing law in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
** A member of the Bar of the State of Washington, presently practicing law in Seattle,
Washington.
I. Abuso de derecho is translated to mean an abusive exercise of rights.
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Facts
The Representative is a sociedad anonima2 duly constituted
under the laws of the Republic of Argentina having its principal
place of business in Buenos Aires, Argentina. It has no offices or
other establishments located in the United States or outside of Ar-
gentina. The Representative's primary business is the marketing of
the products of foreign manufacturers in Argentina.
The Manufacturer has its principal place of business in the
state of Pennsylvania, engaging primarily in the business of manu-
facturing and marketing industrial machinery.
The Manufacturer had begun to manufacture and market in-
dustrial machinery in the mid-1960's and had concentrated its ef-
forts toward the domestic United States sales market. In early
1968, the Representative initiated discussions with the Manufac-
turer regarding the marketing and sale of its machinery in
Argentina. At the time of the discussions with the Representative,
the Manufacturer was neither active nor successful in marketing its
products in Argentina or anywhere else internationally. This was
largely due to the Manufacturer's inability to service its machinery
outside of the United States. Nevertheless, the Manufacturer con-
veyed to the Representative its interest in expanding its exports and
in developing a marketing network in all of South America, partic-
ularly in Argentina.
In April, 1968, the Representative was informed that Mr. Fu-
lano, the Manufacturer's executive responsible for export develop-
ment and the appointment of foreign sales representatives would be
travelling to Argentina. His express purpose for the trip was to ap-
point the Manufacturer's exclusive sales representative in that
country.
During the trip Mr. Fulano spoke to three Argentine firms, in-
cluding the Representative, regarding the appointment of his com-
pany's Argentine representative. At the end of his stay in
Argentina Mr. Fulano orally agreed with the Representative's Pres-
ident to their appointment as the authorized representative of the
Manufacturer in Argentina. Before returning to the United States,
Mr. Fulano notified the other two candidates of his decision.
The Representative began its duties as the Manufacturer's au-
thorized representative in Argentina immediately following the ap-
2. Sociedad anonima is the title given by Spanish speaking nations to business enter-
prises incorporated under their laws.
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pointment by Mr. Fulano. Thereafter all correspondence and
"Field Personnel and Distributor Lists" issued by the Manufacturer
referred to the Representative as the Manufacturer's distributor
and sales representative in Argentina. In September, 1968, at the
Representative's request, the Manufacturer's Assistant Export
Manager issued the first of a series of letters confirming the Repre-
sentative's appointment as the exclusive distributor and sales repre-
sentative for the Manufacturer in Argentina. These letters were
received, accepted and relied upon by the Representative in Argen-
tina.
The Manufacturer promised to reduce the terms and condi-
tions of the representation agreement to writing, but failed to do so
even after being prodded by the Representative. The Manufac-
turer's executives justified the lack of written terms and conditions
on the fact that their policy towards international representation
agreements was not yet settled. They attributed this lack of policy
to the inexperience of management in the exporting and marketing
of their products on the worldwide market. Additionally, the Man-
ufacturer justified the lack of written terms and conditions on the
basis that any such Agreement would be too difficult to draft and
would be too general for the numerous countries which are or
would be product markets.
Notwithstanding the absence of written terms and conditions,
it was orally agreed to, clearly understood by both parties, and
firmly established in practice during the succeeding years, that the
Representative would be the exclusive sales representative for the
Manufacturer's products in Argentina. While maintaining this ca-
pacity, the Representative would assist the Manufacturer in the
promotion, advertising and selling of its products in Argentina in
accordance with the applicable provisions of Argentine law. In ad-
dition, it was agreed that the Representative would be responsible
for the service and repair of the Manufacturer's equipment follow-
ing its shipment to Argentina. These activities would be carried out
pursuant to the corresponding warranties issued by the Manufac-
turer and in accordance with the applicable provisions of Argentine
law.
As compensation for the services rendered by the Representa-
tive as the exclusive Agent in Argentina, the Manufacturer agreed
to grant the Representative a twenty percent discount on the list
price for all machinery sold by it in Argentina, plus an extra two
percent discount for any cash payment made in connection with
Vol. I11
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such sales. It was also agreed that the Representative would be re-
imbursed for certain promotional expenses incurred pursuant to the
applicable Advertising-Promotion Program of the Manufacturer.
Payment of the aforesaid compensation and reimbursements was
normally made by the Manufacturer through credit memoranda
and bank transfers expedited by institutions located in New York
state and Argentina.
The Representative communicated with the Manufacturer
through correspondence originating from its offices in Buenos
Aires, Argentina. Periodically the responsible executives of the
Manufacturer, particularly the Area Managers located in Brazil
and Chile, travelled to Argentina for extended business confer-
ences.
The Representative's representation agreement with the Man-
ufacturer related exclusively to sales consummated and services
performed within the territory encompassing the Republic of Ar-
gentina. Except for a special assignment in Bolivia, which fell
outside the regular scope of its representation agreement with the
Manufacturer and for which it was issued a Special Power of Attor-
ney, the Representative rendered its services exclusively in Argen-
tina.
Until August 29, 1976, Argentine law3 required local compa-
nies representing foreign entities in Argentina to register as such in
a special registry.4 The Representative duly registered as the sales
representative for the Manufacturer in Argentina, thereby subject-
ing itself to all the consequences created thereunder.
The Representative rendered performance under the represen-
tation agreement continuously from 1968 to 1976. Without any
prior notice whatsoever, by telex communication and letter dated
June 22, 1976, the Manufacturer terminated the representation
agreement as of the date of the correspondence. These communica-
tions, which were sent to and received by the Representative in
Argentina, also stated that the Manufacturer would process all
purchase orders submitted by the Representative within thl next
thirty days. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Manufacturer re-
fused to accept twenty purchase orders submitted by the Represen-
tative on July 13, 1976. In addition, the Manufacturer appointed a
new sales representative for Argentina, who proceeded to contact
3. Anales de Legislaci6n Argentina [ 1974] [hereinafter cited as Legislaci6n Argentina].
4. Id. at Registro de Inversiones Extranjeras,. Law No. 20,575.
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many of the prospective customers referred to in the purchase or-
ders submitted by the Representative.
The Representative commenced a civil action against the Man-
ufacturer in September, 1976, in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania for breach of contract and
"abusive exercise of rights."
I. THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW
A1. Question
The sole question presented to the Court was whether the law
of the Republic of Argentina should govern the rights and duties of
the respective parties with respect to the issues of breach of contract
and abusive exercise of rights.
B. Statement of Law and Argument
1. Choice ofLaw Rule. In a diversity action the Federal Dis-
trict Court is bound to apply the choice of law rule of the jurisdic-
tion in which it sits.5
In 1964, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, after extensive
analysis, adopted as its choice of law rule the "most significant con-
tacts theory" now embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws.6 Since that time Pennsylvania courts and the Federal
Courts sitting in Pennsylvania have consistently recognized and fol-
lowed this modern Restatement Second approach in actions based
on both tort and contract. Both judicial levels look to the local law
of the place with the most significant relationship to the parties and
the transaction.7
This Restatement Second approach to choice of law problems
has been variously referred to in cases and literature as "grouping
of contacts," "most significant relationship," "most significant con-
tacts," "center of gravity" and "interest analysis." In practice this
means that the court will analyze the policies and interests underly-
ing the issues before it and then apply the local law of the state
having the greatest interest and the most direct contacts with the
matter in dispute.
5. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
6. Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1971) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND)].
7. Gillan v. Gillan, 345 A.2d 742 (Pa. Super. 1975); Neville Chemical Co. v. Union
Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970).
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In the case of McSwain v. AcSwain, 8 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, while applying the Restatement Second approach,
stated:
Whether the policies of one state rather than another should be
furthered in the event of conflict can only be determined within
the matrix of specific litigation. What should be sought is an
analysis of the extent to which one state rather than another has
demonstrated, by reason of its policies and their connection and
relevance to the matter in dispute, a priority of interest in the
application of its rule of law.
9
The court went on in the case of DeAngelis v. Scott' and
stated that
[u]nder the modern dispensation now applied in Pennsylvania, it
appears that we are neither controlled by the law of the place
where the contract right arose (Pennsylvania) nor by the law of
the place where the assignment was made (Mass.). The courts of
Pennsylvania now say that in determining the applicable law we
give to the place having the most interest in the problem para-
mount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular
factual context.'
In determining the validity of a release, the Pennsylvania court
in Weddington v. Jackson 2 relied on German law and stated:
In adopting this [most significant relationship] rule, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court quoted with approval from a decision of
the New York Court of Appeals, holding that "[j]ustice, fairness,
and the 'best practical result'. . . may best be achieved by giving
controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of
its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has
the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litiga-
tion." 13
To select the jurisdiction whose law should govern determina-
tion of the validity of the release in question, GrVith and its
progeny require the identification of the jurisdiction with the
most significant contacts with the parties and occurrences in
question. By this standard, it is clear that Germany has the most
significant contacts with the parties and occurrences in question;
therefore, the validity of the release before me should be mea-
8. McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966).
9. Id. at 682.
10. DeAngelis v. Scott, 337 F. Supp. 1021 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
11. Id. at 1022.
12. Weddington v. Jackson, 331 F. Supp. 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
13. Id. at 1273.
6
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sured by the law of Germany.14
There are several sections of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws 5 which are particularly relevant to the considerations
in this case. The Restatement Second provides that subject to con-
stitutional restrictions, a court will follow the choice of law statu-
tory directive of its own state. 16 However, should there be no
directive, the Restatement Second lists the factors which are rele-
vant in determining the applicable law. 7 These include the needs
of the interstate and international systems, '8 the relevant policies of
the forum and other interested states,' 9 the protection of justified
expectations2° and the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law.2'
The Restatement Second provides that the parties are free to
choose and designate the state whose law will determine issues in
contract.22 However, where no choice is made by the parties, the
law of the state which has the "most significant relationship" to the
parties and the transaction will apply.23
Application of the "most significant relationship" doctrine re-
quires an examination of the contacts between the parties. These
include, the place of negotiation, contracting and performance of
the contract;24 the location of the subject matter of the contract;
25
and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and
place of business of the parties.26 The contacts' relative importance
to the particular issue should govern their evaluation.27 Addition-
ally, if the place of performance is in the same state that the con-
tract was negotiated, the local law of this state will usually be
14. Id. at 1275.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6.
16. Id. at § 6(I).
17. Id. at § 6(2).
18. Id. at § 6(2)(a).
19. Id. at § 6(2)(b), (c). Section (6)(2)(c) continues on to state that the relative interests
of those other interested states in the determination of the particular issue is also a factor to
be considered.
20. Id. at § 6(2)(d).
2 1. Id. at § 6(2)(e). Section (6)(2)(f) includes the factors of certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result in the consideration process. Subsection (2)(g) lists the ease in the deter-
mination and application of the law to be applied as the final factor to be examined.
22. Id. at § 186.
23. Id. at § 188(1).
24. Id. at § 188(2)(a), (b) & (c).
25. Id. at § 188(2)(d).
26. Id. at § 188(2)(e).
27. Id. at § 188(2).
Vol. I11
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applied.2"
There are exceptions in the Restatement Second which specify
the use of certain law in various situations in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties. In the case of a service con-
tract, the local law of the state in which the services or a major
portion thereof will be rendered governs. 29 However, the applica-
tion of the rules of Sections 187 and 188 of the Restatement Second,
as discussed above, govern the determination of the rights and du-
ties of a principal and agent towards each other, as well as deter-
mining the measure of recovery for a breach of contract action.3
In the case of Neville Chemical Company v. Union Carbide Cor-
poration 3! the Court applied the principles stated above and deter-
mined specifically that "[t]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court follows
the modem approach and looks to the law of the place with the
most significant relationship to the parties and the transaction, on
each issue, or the center of gravity of the contract. '' 32 Accordingly,
the most significant relationship rule should now be applied in this
case to determine the law governing the issues relating to breach of
contract and abusive exercise of rights.
II. THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA IS THE STATE WITH THE
MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TO THE MATTER IN
DISPUTE AND ITS LOCAL LAW SHOULD BE
APPLIED TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED
A. Application of the Most Significant Relationship Principle
Since the parties in the case at hand did not expressly agree on
an effective choice of law in their representation contract, the fol-
lowing contacts should be taken into account in applying the "most
significant relationship" principle to determine the applicable law
in the present action:
(1) The place of contracting;
(2) The place of negotiation of the contract;
28. Id. at § 188(3).
29. Id. at § 196. However, if another state has a more significant relationship to the
parties and the transaction with respect to the particular issue, its local law will be applied.
The more significant relationship will be determined under the principles stated in Section 6.
Id. The Restatement Second also states that the local law of the place of performance deter-
mines issues related to the details of that performance. Id. at § 206.
30. Id. at §§ 207 & 291.
31. Neville Chemical Company v. Union Carbide Corporation, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.
1970).
32. Id. at 1210-11.
8
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(3) The place of performance;
(4) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties; and,
(5) The law relied upon by the parties in their performance
under the contract.
33
1. Place of Contracting. In April, 1968, the Manufacturer
sent Mr. Fulano, its international sales and marketing executive to
Argentina for the express purpose of appointing its exclusive repre-
sentative for machinery sales in Argentina. During his visit Mr.
Fulano selected and appointed the Representative to serve as his
company's exclusive sales representative in Argentina and the Rep-
resentative agreed to and accepted this appointment. Argentina
was clearly the place of contracting.
2. Place of Negotiation of the Contract. The material terms
and conditions of the sales representation agreement by and be-
tween the Manufacturer and the Representative were discussed and
negotiated by Mr. Fulano and the President of the Representative
in Argentina during April, 1968. Consequently, Argentina was the
place of negotiation of the contract.
3. Place of Performance. The subject matter and principal
objective of the sales representation agreement was the pursuance
and obtaining of machinery sales in Argentina. All sales activities
under the representation agreement were undertaken and consum-
mated within the Republic of Argentina. The machinery sales ob-
tained by the Representative were made exclusively to entities
operating within the Republic of Argentina and all equipment re-
lated thereto was delivered to them in the Republic of Argentina.
All equipment sold under the sales representation agreement was
assembled and operated in Argentina. The Representative main-
tained and serviced the machinery in Argentina under the Manu-
facturer's applicable warranty and all spare parts were .delivered
and installed in Argentina. The Representative rendered all of its
services and performance under the representation agreement in
the Republic of Argentina. Consequently, Argentina was clearly
the place of performance.
4. Domicile, Residence, Nationality, Place of Incorporation and
Place of Business of the Parties. The Representative, the party
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at § 188.
Vol. I I
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seeking damages under the representation agreement, is an Argen-
tine corporation with offices in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Argentina
is the place of incorporation and the principal place of business of
the Representative. The Representative does business exclusively
in the Republic of Argentina. The Manufacturer is a Pennsylvania
corporation and does business throughout the United States and in
numerous foreign countries.
5. Law Relied Upon by the Parties in Their Performance
Under the Contract. Argentina is the State whose law was relied
upon and adhered to by the Representative and the Manufacturer
in their performances under the sales representation agreement.
Compliance with Argentine law by both the Representative and the
Manufacturer was absolutely necessary and essential to effect ma-
chinery sales in Argentina. The manner in which sales were ob-
tained, documented, consummated, financed and imported under
the sales representation agreement were controlled and dictated
primarily by the laws of the Republic of Argentina. The Represen-
tative's responsibilities and liability to its Argentine customers, the
Republic of Argentina and the Manufacturer were circumscribed
by Argentine law. The Representative and the Manufacturer
molded their conduct under the representation agreement to con-
form to the legal and commercial requirements of Argentina. The
parties relied upon no other law as heavily as they relied upon the
law of the Republic of Argentina.
6. Additional Considerations. The protection of justified ex-
pectations is another of the relevant factors set forth in the Restate-
ment Second.3 4 The sales of the Manufacturer's equipment in
Argentina had to be obtained, consummated and serviced in ac-
cordance with the law of Argentina. Both the Representative and
the Manufacturer relied on the pertinent provisions of Argentine
law in their performances under the representation agreement. It
follows that the parties contemplated, from the very commence-
ment of their relationship in 1968, the application of Argentine law.
It was their probable intention, expectation and desire that such
law would be applied to any and all controversies arising during
34. Id. at § 6. Additionally, Comment d to § 6 states that
[p]robably the most important function of choice-of-law rules is to make the inter-
state and international systems work well. Choice-of-law rules, among other
things, should seek to further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate
commercial intercourse between them. In formulating rules of choice of law, a state
should have regard for the needs and policies of other states and the community of
states.
10
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the course of performance. Consequently, the application of Ar-
gentine law herein would clearly protect the justified expectations
of the parties.
The Restatement Second specifically provides in pertinent part
that "[i]f the place of negotiating the contract and the place of per-
formance are in the same state, the local law of this state will usu-
ally be applied. . .... The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
followed this approach in the case of In re Danz Estate35 and ap-
plied German law in determining the validity of a gift contract "be-
cause that is the place where the contract was made and was to be
performed."36
A comment following section 291 of the Restatement Second
asserts that
[T]he state where performance by the agent is to take place will
usually be given the greatest weight in the absence of an effective
choice of law by the parties. . . , in determining what law gov-
erns the rights and duties owed by the principal and agent to
each other.37
In the case of contracts specifically for the rendition of serv-
ices, the Restatement Second refers directly to the "local law of the
state where the contract requires that the services, or a major por-
tion of the services, be rendered. ' 38 The commentary following this
section further illuminates this point and states that:
[s]everal factors serve to explain the importance attributed by the
rule to the place where the contract requires that the services, or
a major portion of the services, be rendered. The rendition of
the services is the principal objective of the contract, and the
place where the services, or a major portion of the services, are to
be rendered will naturally loom large in the minds of parties.
Indeed, it can often be assumed that the parties, to the extent that
they thought about the matter at all, would expect that the local
law of the state where the services, or a major portion of the
services, are to be rendered would be applied to determine many
of the issues arising under the contract. The state where the serv-
ices are to be rendered will also have a natural interest in them
and indeed may have an overriding interest in the application to
them of certain of its regulatory rules. The rule of this Section
also furthers the choice-of-law values of certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result and, since the place where the contract
35. In Re Danz Estate, 441 Pa. 411, 283 A.2d 282 (1971).
36. Id. at 284.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 6, at § 291, Comment f.
38. Id. at § 196.
Vol. I I
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requires that the services, or a major portion of the services, are
to be rendered will be readily ascertainable, of ease in the deter-
mination of the applicable law.
3 9
The foregoing authorities establish that the place of perform-
ance is a highly significant, if not the most significant, "contact" for
purposes of applying Pennsylvania's choice of law rule in cases
such as the one now at hand. The representation agreement be-
tween the Representative and the Manufacturer concerned the sale
of heavy equipment in Argentina. It was negotiated, made and per-
formable in Argentina. Argentina was clearly its place of perform-
ance. This "significant contact" dictates, in accordance with the
choice of law rule presently prevailing in Pennsylvania, that the lo-
cal law of Argentina should be applied to determine the rights and
duties of the parties under such agreement.
It is clear from the facts that the "most significant relationship
and contacts" with respect to the representation agreement, both
qualitative and quantitative, occurred in, and are closely identified
with, the Republic of Argentina. Parties entering into such a repre-
sentation agreement in Argentina should be able to do so with con-
fidence in the validity and stability of the agreement as measured
by Argentine law. Conversely, no other jurisdiction has anywhere
near the significant relationship or contacts to the transaction or the
parties as the Republic of Argentina. Accordingly, for the forego-
ing reasons, the law of Argentina should be applied to the issues
presented.
III. THE CONCEPT OF ABUSO DE DERECHO
A. History of "buso de Derecho" in Civil Law
The concept of abuso de derecho (or abuse of rights or the abu-
sive exercise of rights) was originally developed in France in the
cases of Affaire Doerr' and Eaux Minerales Saint Galmier.4 In
these cases the eminent jurists did not consider it acceptable to give
legal protection to actions taken by owners and creditors, regardless
of their motives, if such actions exercised rights with the sole intent
to harm another.42 This school of thought includes actions without
a legitimate interest on the part of the owner or holder of the right
39. Id. at Comment c.
40. Affaire Doerr, Colmar, May 2, 1855, D.P. 1856.2.9.
41. Eaux Minerales Sait Galmier, Lyon, April 18, 1856, D.P. 1856.2.199.
42. Cueto Rua, Abuse ofRights, 35 LOUISIANA L. REV. 956, 996 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Cueto Rua].
1981
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worthy of legal protection, actions against some acknowledged gen-
eral or accepted principles of good faith or positive morality and
actions against a widely recognized criterion of elementary fair-
ness.
43
The principle of abuse of rights has been accepted, developed
and incorporated into the positive law of many civil law coun-
tries." For example, the German Land Recht Prusiano of 1974,
and the German Civil Code of 1900 prohibit the abusive exercise of
rights and contain express provisions governing the duty to indem-
nify for damages caused in connection therewith. Article 826 of the
German Civil Code (BGB) provides that "[a] person who wilfully
causes damage to another in a manner contra bonos mores is bound
to compensate the other for the damages." Similarly, Article 11(2)
of the Swiss Civil Code states that "... [t]he law does not protect
the manifest abuse of a right."
B. "Abuso de Derecho" in the Law of Argentina
In Argentina, the concept of abuse of rights was first developed
in doctrine and case law before being expressly incorporated into
the positive law. The text of Civil Code Article 1071 originally
read, "The exercise of one's right or the performance of a legal obli-
gation cannot make unlawful any act." In 1968, Article 1071 of the
Civil Code was amended to read:
The regular exercise of one's right or the performance of a legal
obligation cannot make unlawful any act.
The law does not protect the abusive exercise of rights. That
which is contrary to the purpose that the law intended when the
rights were recognized, or that which exceeds the limits imposed
by good faith, morality and good customs shall be deemed an
abusive exercise of rights.45
The difference between the amended text of Civil Code Article
1071 and its former text is illustrative of the legislative intent in this
regard. As can be seen, the amendment, in addition to incorporat-
ing the wholly new second paragraph specifically regarding abuse
of rights, added the qualifying element of "regular" to the first par-
agraph thereof. This addition significantly limited the exercise of
rights protected.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 972.
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The principle of good faith was also expressly adopted in
Argentine law in the first paragraph of Article 1198 of the Civil
Code by the 1968 amendment.
Contracts must be executed, construed and performed in good
faith and in accordance with what the parties most likely under-
stood or were able to understand, acting with care or foresight.46
This principle of good faith has been applied and construed by Ar-
gentine courts in many case decisions.47
Argentine law also embraces the concept of good customs and
the effect of any breach thereof is set forth in Article 953 of the
Civil Code.
The object of legal acts must be things which are commercial, or
which have not been prohibited for any special reason from be-
ing the object of any legal act, or events which are not impossi-
ble, unlawful, contrary to good customs or prohibited by law, or
do not oppose the freedom of action or conscience, or do not
prejudice the rights of a third party. Legal acts which do not
conform to this provision are null and void as if they had no
object.48
C. Analysis of Article 1071 of the Argentine Civil Code
Guillermo Borda, one of the principal drafters of the 1968
amendment, after reviewing the modification of Civil Code Article
1071 by the amendment stated that "[the addition of the word 'reg-
ular' to the first paragraph] modifies substantially the meaning of
the principle: the exercise of a right is not always protected by law;
it must be a 'regular' exercise, that is, just, legitimate, normal.
49
Borda goes on to explain the criterion used in establishing the
concept of abuse of rights:
...It is deemed that there is abuse when the exercise [of the
right] is contrary to the ends taken into account by the law when
recognizing such right, or when such exercise is contrary to good
faith, morality and good customs.
50
He then clarifies the factors that the judge should take into consid-
eration when determining whether there has been an abusive exer-
cise of rights.
In his decision, the judge should consider if the following exist:
46. Id. at art. 1198.
47. Cf. Diario La Ley, June 17, 1974, case no. 70465 and Diario La Ley, October 10,
1974, case no. 70989, as cited in Cueto Rua, supra note 43, at 1000.
48. Legislaci6n Argentina, supra note 3, Cod. Civ. Art. 953.
49. 1 G. BORDA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL 51 (6th ed. 1976).
50. Id.
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1) intent to harm; 2) absence of interest; 3) if, among the various
ways of exercising the right, the way which is harmful to others
has been chosen; 4) if the resulting loss is abnormal or excessive;
5) if the conduct or performance is contrary to "good customs"
(buenas costumbres); 6) if [the defendant] has acted in an unrea-
sonable manner, repugnant to loyalty and to mutual trust.
5'
The letter and spirit of Article 1071 of the Argentine Civil
Code, in establishing the legal principle of abuse of rights within
the positive law of Argentina, is captured precisely by Borda.
If the theory of abuse of rights has made headway, it is due to
moral reasons. All the teachings of prestigious jurists against its
admission have become ineffectual against the feeling of justice
which each man lodges in his heart and which cannot tolerate
any attempt to justify under the guise of the law that which is
arbitrary, immoral or harmful.
52
It is important to emphasize in this regard that the concept of
abuse of rights in Argentine law has been based principally on the
"functional" (finalista orfuncional) and "moral" criteria. That is to
say, there is an "abusive exercise of a right" when the right has
been exercised either contrary to the economic and social purpose
of the law that created such right, in other words the "functional"
criterion, or contrary to morality and good faith, the "moral" crite-
rion. Borda specifically states that the traditional French and Eng-
lish criteria regarding abuse of rights, which focus primarily on the
defendant's gross negligence, lack of interest and intention to cause
damage to third parties, are inadequate, and were not adopted by
the 1968 modification to Article 1071 of the Civil Code. Conse-
quently, the Argentine concept of abuse of rights should, arguendo,
be construed by judges (both Argentine judges and American
judges applying Argentine law) much more in line with the subjec-
tive moral criterion, "good customs" and good faith, than with the
objective criterion based on fault, interest and intent.
D. Precedent.- Dillon S.A. v. Ford Motor
Argentina S.A.
The rather recent decision of Dillon S.A. v. Ford Motor-
51. Id. at 52, citing Markovitch, La Theorie de I'abus des droits en droit compare, Paris
1936, No. 358; Repetto Mario I, et al v. Blanco, Carlos, (C. Civil Cap.), Sala A, October 18,
1957, 91 La Ley 531.
52. BORDA, supra note 49, at 46.
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Argentina S.A. ,5 rendered by the highest commercial court of Ar-
gentina, involved a plaintiff who entered into an automobile
franchise business with the defendant. Pursuant to a standard form
or adhesion contract issued by the defendant, the plaintiff would
receive a commission on all automobiles sold by it. Under the
terms of said contract, the defendant had no obligation to deliver to
the plaintiff a specific number of vehicles and had the right to can-
cel the franchise at any time by mere prior notice. Based on the
representations and projected sales and production schedule of the
defendant, the plaintiff expanded its operations rapidly and became
heavily indebted. The defendant was consistently errant and tardy
in its delivery of vehicles to the plaintiff and abruptly cancelled the
plaintiff's franchise by telegram a few hours after the plaintiff had
read about such cancellation in several newspapers. At the time of
cancellation, the plaintiff was the sixth largest Ford dealer in terms
of sales (out of 236) and had pending orders for eighty-nine vehi-
cles. In an effort to receive delivery of sufficient vehicles to com-
plete its pending sales, the plaintiff agreed to waive irrevocably all
its rights to commence legal proceedings against the defendant.
The plaintiff, however, subsequently commenced an action against
the defendant for breach of contract and abusive cancellation of its
franchise.
The trial court dismissed the action based on its finding that
the waiver was entered into willingly by the plaintiff and thus it had
no right to bring suit against the defendant. The appellate court
reversed the lower court and found for the plaintiff, awarding it
$40,000,000.00 in damages; $15,000,000.00 for loss of goodwill, and
$25,000,000.00 in general damages.
5 4
The Dillon case is the latest major pronouncement by an Ar-
gentine appellate court construing the principle of abuse of rights.
It established several major points:
a) The invocation by the defendant of the clause of the
franchise agreement that authorized cancellation may not be dis-
cretionary or arbitrary, and its exercise must be subject to the prin-
ciples of good faith, equity, loyalty and reasonableness.
b) The principle of good faith is based on law and of a legal
nature.
c) The arbitrary cancellation of a contract that causes unnec-
53. Dillon S.A. v. Ford Motor Argentina S.A., (C.N. Com.), Sala A, September 11,
1973, 152 La Ley 250.
54. Damages were awarded in pesos the monetary denomination of Argentina.
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essary harm to the cancelled party is not admissible because it con-
stitutes an abuse of rights.
d) The conduct of those who abusively exercise a right con-
stitutes an unlawful act pursuant to Civil Code Article 1071 and,
accordingly, all the consequences of an unlawful act are attributa-
ble thereto.
That part of the Dillon decision which is most pertinent to the
concept of abuse of rights is transcribed below:
What consequence does the abusive exercise of a right have? Af-
ter the enactment of Law 17,771, with the resulting amendment
of Article 1071, the answer is simple: Since the abusive exercise
of rights is not permitted, such conduct is unlawful. And, there-
fore, it will produce all the consequences of an unlawful act, to
wit: a) In the first place, the judge shall deny protection to any-
one who tried to abusively exercise a right and shall dismiss his
complaint. b) Secondly, if the abusive conduct has extra-judicial
effects, the judge shall demand that the guilty party stop such
conduct. c) Lastly, the guilty party shall be liable for damages in
the same manner as the perpetrator of any unlawful act: He is
liable for all damages, including punitive damages (Art. 1078,
Civil Code) and if there are several guilty parties, the liability is
jointly held (Art. 1109) ...[E.D., Book 29, 726]. 55
E. Damages
There are four articles in the Argentine Civil Code which gov-
ern the issue of damages. They provide that damages will be avail-
able when the loss caused is susceptible to pecuniary evaluation;
5 6
when there is a loss which is directly related to things in a person's
control or possession; or when the loss is an indirect result of a
wrong committed to the person's body, rights or powers.
5 7
General damages include the loss incurred as well as the loss
of anticipated profits.58 The financial situation of the party suffer-
ing the loss can also be taken into account during the judges delib-
eration process.
59
Additionally, Argentina's codified duty to indemnify for dam-
ages includes not only indemnification of losses and general dam-
55. Id. at 264.
56. Legislaci6n Argentina, supra note 3, Cod. Civ. Art. 1068.
57. Id.




Skola and Perey: The Termination of Representation Agreements: The Application of
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981
ABUSO DE DERECHO
ages, but compensation for the punitive damages as well.6" This
liability to indemnify applies to damages intentionally and negli-
gently inflicted.6
The court in the Dillon case applied the appropriate Civil
Code sections and came to the following conclusion on the issue of
damages and the scope of the liable party's duty to indemnify the
injured party.62 The court stated that:
. . . the responsible party shall be liable for damages in the same
manner as the perpetrator of an unlawful act: He is liable for all
damages, including punitive damages [pursuant to Article 1078 of
the Civil Code], and if there are several liable parties, the liabil-
ity is jointly held .... 63
Dr. Borda states in another of his treatises that:
all damages mean the direct consequences; the forseen and for-
seeable indirect consequences; and the accidental consequences
of the unlawful act which resulted as intended by the liable party
at the time of performing such unlawful act, excluding therefrom
the remote consequences that do not have an adequate causal
connection with the unlawful act.'
In the leading case in Argentina regarding abuse of rights, Dil-
Ion v. Ford,65 the judge awarded the plaintiff $40,000,000.00 in
damages. In making this award the court made the following ob-
servations.
The argument in this case that there is no right to indemnifica-
tion for the goodwill lost through the cancellation of the automo-
bile dealership, because this risk was forseen, is groundless since
forseen risk is normal in a cancellation lawfully carried out, but
not in an unlawful rescission, such as the present case, which is
the result of an abusive attitude.
In each lawsuit, the judges determine the amount of goodwill;
they cannot choose a fixed system, but should analyze the ele-
ments of the lawsuit that constitute the claim therein.66
60. Id. at art. 1078.
61. Id. at art. 1109.
62. Dillon S.A. v. Ford Motor Argentina S.A., supra note 53, at 264; citing BORDA,
supra note 49, at 24.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. G. BORDA, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL ARGENTINO, OBLIGACIONES II - (6th ed.
1976); citing Legislaci6n Argentina, supra note 3, Cod. Civ., at arts. 901, 902, 904, 905 and
906.
65. Dillion S.A. v. Ford Motor Argentina S.A., supra note 53.
66. Id. at 253.
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In awarding general damages the Argentine court cited the fol-
lowing as the basis for their award.
Discharge of personnel; losses sustained in the sale of fixed as-
sets; lost profits - not subject to dispute - and losses sustained
in the sale of rights and in the forced cancellation of intangible
assets; losses not shown in the books of account; legal fees; ex-
change losses; interest charges; losses from bad debts; loss of a
down payment on the purchase of land; non-amortized expenses
of forming the business; advertising expenses; obligations as-
sumed by members of the Board of Directors; unpaid balance of
mortgage; and penalties or additional taxes - subject to dis-
pute.67
The appellate court awarded the plaintiff damages for loss of
goodwill, citing various factors taken into consideration. These in-
cluded: the type and quality of the business; the experience of the
aggrieved party in the business; the location of the business; the rate
of sales or the growth of the business; the type and nature of the
clientele of the aggrieved party; the commercial results of the busi-
ness; and, the circumstances surrounding the contract negotiation
and origin of the business.68
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the factual situation described and the legal provi-
sions and authorities cited herein, it is reasonable to conclude that
the Representative had a valid legal claim against the Manufac-
turer. This claim is based on the concept of abuse of rights and
includes all damages caused to the Representative as the result of
the Manufacturer's cancellation of its representation agreement, in-
cluding general, consequential and punitive damages.
This conclusion is based on the following rationale:
Point 1: The Manufacturer's cancellation of its representation
agreement with the Representative was capricious and arbitrary
and contrary to the principle of good faith set forth in Article 1198
of the Civil Code of Argentina.
Point 2: The Manufacturer's cancellation of the representation
agreement contrary to the principle of good faith constituted an
abusive exercise of its right to cancel such agreement under Article
1071 of the Civil Code.
Point 3: The Manufacturer's abusive exercise of its right to
67. Id. at 263.
68. Id. at 270.
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cancel the representation agreement was an unlawful act and, as
such, rendered the Manufacturer liable for all general, consequent-
ial and punitive damages, including loss of goodwill, caused to the
Representative, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1069
and 1078 of the Civil Code.
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